U.S. Attacks Two Petrostates. Is There A Colonial Motive Here?

Originally published on Forbes.com on March 5, 2026

Sanctions by the U.S., then falling oil production, followed by military attacks, do suggest a pattern that points to a colonial motive of conquer, expand, and exploit. 

Two Petrostates

The US attacked Iran on February 28, 2026, less than two months after attacking Venezuela on January 3 and capturing President Maduro.

Both countries are petrostates whose economy is heavily dependent on the extraction and export of oil or natural gas. Venezuela and Iran are No. 1 and No. 3 in the world for oil reserves. But sanctions and lack of investments by Western countries meant a decline in oil production after 2010 in both countries. Sanctions by the U.S., then falling oil production, followed by military attacks, do suggest a pattern. And the pattern may point to a colonial motive.

Effect On Oil And Gas Prices

The price of oil futures bumped up after Iran was struck by the U.S. and Israel on Saturday. The fighting has spilled over with up to nine countries involved in a wider Middle East war.

The WTI price of crude oil rose from $64/barrel in February to $76.5/barrel on Thursday, a jump of 20%.

Liquefied natural gas or LNG prices have jumped about 50% following the shutdown of QatarEnergy’s Ras Laffan plant. The largest in the world, Ras Laffen, was apparently hit by an Iranian drone. It may take a month before the plant returns to full production.

About 20% of the world’s LNG is supplied by Qatar. More than 80% of its customers are in Asia, including China, Japan, India, South Korea, and Pakistan. Europe has also increased its LNG imports from Qatar when gas supplies from Russia were cut off by the war in Ukraine.

Even a short disruption to Qatar exports can impact global gas supply. It may take a month for LNG production and exports to return to normal levels. Europe and Asia are now looking to other LNG suppliers such as Australia and the U.S.

Could oil prices reach $100 per barrel again? The last time WTI traded above $100 was in March of 2022, early days of the Russian war in Ukraine, and prices stayed there for several months.

Future prices of oil are subject to large uncertainties. How long will this war last? An answer in months seems more likely than in weeks. How many neighboring countries will be involved (the latest number is nine)? How soon will opposing sides run out of ballistic missiles?

Second, who will control the Strait of Hormuz, a narrow neck of sea separating Iran to the north from the Saudi peninsula to the south. It appears that Iran has closed the Strait, which controls about 20% of the world’s oil distribution.

Third, who will control Iran, meaning internally? Will Reza Pahlavi, the eldest son of Iran’s last Shah, return to power? Or will a group coalesce around student protestors and seek a democratic government? Or will large-scale unrest lead to a chaotic vacuum of power in a country of 90 million people? Any of these events could push the price of oil toward $100 a barrel.

Oil Production

Venezuela makes 860,000 barrels per day (bpd), although the peak in 1997 was 3,000,000 bpd. Hugo Chavez came to power in 1999 and started to nationalize the oil industry. But it collapsed in the period 2017-2020 when Trump Part 1 imposed two separate sanctions on the oil industry.  By 2020, oil production was a bit more than 500,000 bpd.

What about Iran? Table 1 lists some key events that show oil production decreasing after sanctions were applied, or increasing when sanctions were lifted. One significant observation is the Trump Part 1 cancelation in 2018 of the joint nuclear deal forged by John Kerry under the Obama administration. After this cancelation Iran’s oil production increased to 5 million bpd.

But this was followed by a large production decline to 3 million bpd when sanctions were reinstated by the Trump Part 1 administration in 2018-2020.

Table 1. Source: GIS Reports.
Table 1. Source: GIS Reports

Economics Of Iran And Venezuela.

Despite immense oil wealth, both petrostates have failed economically, and sadly, these are countries of large populations: 90 million in Iran, and 30 million in Venezuela. Venezuela was a rich country because of its oil wealth before 1980, but it is currently a very poor country with widespread poverty.

For Iran in 2024, petroleum was the primary export (56%), and China was the main importer of Iran’s products (36%). But Iran is also a poor country, and 2025 was a very bad year. The currency collapsed, and rising inflation that exceeded 40% led to unrest in many parts. Students and workers coalesced into nationwide protests in late 2025, but were met by harsh suppression by the government, including internet shutdowns, arrests, and deaths that numbered at 7,000 but could be as high as 20,000.

Table 2. Numbers for GDP/capita from IMF in USD. Source: IMF
Table 2. Numbers for GDP/capita from IMF in USD. Source: IMF

The economic state of a country can be gauged by its GDP per capita. Table 1 comes from data prepared by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Iran lies in the lower half, at 131 out of 193 total countries. Venezuela is positioned even lower in the table. It’s sobering to see the huge discrepancies between these oil-rich petrostates and other successful economies of the world.

The Strait of Hormuz 

The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow neck of the sea below Iran’s southern coast. The seaway is the primary shipping route for oil from Saudi Arabia (5.4 million bpd), Iraq (3.3 million bpd), the UAE (2.0 million bpd), and Iran (1.7 million bpd). About one-fifth of daily global production (20 million bpd) flows through the strait every day.

Where does this oil go? China gets 4.6 million bpd, and India gets 2.1 million bpd. Other Asian countries receive 6.2 million bpd. Closing the Strait could be a major debacle for China and other Asian countries.

The Strait of Hormuz has essentially closed because some oil tankers have been attacked. The danger is harassment by Iran’s navy, which could also lay mines in the sea. Although one of the U.S. goals is to destroy the Iranian navy, tanker captains and owners are conscious of the risk of attack, and aware that tanker insurance costs will be rising because of the danger.

What Trump Deals Are In Store With Iran?

In Venezuela, Chavez started nationalizing the oil industry after 1999, when oil was around 3 million bpd. But oil collapsed in the period 2017-2020 when Trump Part 2 imposed two separate sanctions on the oil industry.  By 2020, oil was a bit more than 500,000 bpd. Then, Trump Part 2 attacked Venezuela on January 3, 2026.

In Iran, Trump Part 1 reinstated sanctions in 2018 – 2020, which dropped production from 5 to 3 million bpd. Then, Trump Part 2 attacked Iran in February 2026.

Are these events calculated or a coincidence? U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth promised on Monday “a Venezuelan-type resolution to the situation in Iran,” which points to the former.

The transactional nature of Trump is to set up deals with other countries based on a threat of tariff increases, and often requiring them to provide resources such as rare earths, or to invest in U.S. business entities (Japan and South Korea).

In Venezuela, the other petrostate attacked by the U.S., Donald Trump wants to engage major oil companies from the U.S. to reinvigorate the oil production in Venezuela, sell the oil, and split the profits between the U.S. and Venezuela. At first blush, this seems like a reasonable vision, because the world is still hungry for oil. But deciding on an equitable split of the profits may be dicey in view of the MAGA philosophy prevailing in the present U.S. government.

If a similar scheme crystallizes in Iran, the pattern in both countries would point to a colonial motive, as when European countries like Spain, the UK, France, and the Netherlands established colonies in far parts of the world for hundreds of years until World War II. 

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